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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

GERALD E. HULBERT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
. - vs-

Case No •
16197

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Defendant and Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

There are some basic errors in Respondent's analysis
of this case and the law applicable thereto as reflected in
his brief.

It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to

point these out to the court in order that the issues herewith
presented may be fully analyzed and more fairly determined.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO HEAR THIS CASE AND THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST THE STATE OF UTAH
EXCEPT AS TO THE MANNER IN WHICH HIS
CLAIM WAS FILED.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-Act,
l-administered by the Utah State Library.
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The respondent asserts that the statute under
which he sought relief in this case was governed by all
the proc-:dures of the Governmental Immunity Act which he
atteges supersedes the constitutional power of the Board
of Examiners to hear and determine his claim by vesting
such jurisdiction in the district courts.
10-14 of respondent's brief.)

(See pages

Section 63-30a-3, Utah

Code Annotated 1953, as enacted specially for the benefit
of the respondent as a result of his lobbying efforts in
1977, provides as follows:
This act shall apply to claims
arising prior to the effect1ve date
of this act so long as those claims
are filed in the manner provided in
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
and within two years after the cause
of action arises. (Emphasis added.)
The foregoing statute contains the only reference in Chapter
30a to the Governmental Immunity Act and there is no ambiguity cr uncertainty as to its provisions requiring retroactive
claims to be filed in accordance with that act.

Recognizing

this fact the respondent has resourcefully resorted to the
title of the act (Chapter 245, Laws of Utah 1977) to support
his thesis.

That title is as follows:

An act relating to governmental
affairs; providing for the reimbursement to officers and employees of the
state for legal fees and costs necessarily incurred in the successful defense
of grand jury indictments; defining
terms; and providing that the act shall
apply to all cla1ms subr;-,itted within
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the time limits and in the manner provided in the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. (Emphasis Added.)
Thus the respondent would supplant the substantive and 11•1ted
provisions of the act with the descriptive and general ter•s
set forth in the title of the act.

No support in American

and English jurisprudence can be cited for such a principle.
The universal rule is set forth as follows in 73 Am. Jur. 2d,
Statutes, 198:
The rule which permits reading the
title of an act in aid of statutory construction applies only in cases where
the legislative meaning is left in
doubt by failure to clearly express it
in the law. Moreover, the ambiguit~
which justifies a resort to the tit e
must arise in the body of the actj an
ambiguity arising from the title 1s not
sufficient. Thus where the punctuation
in the body of the act conforms to the
intent otherwise disclosed therein, a
different punctuation of corresponding
language in the title is· of no consequence.
Similarly the use of a singular number in
the title is not persuasive against the
application of the plural to the same
subject matter in accordance with the
words of the act. The title cannot be
resorted to for the purpose of restricting or enlarging the scope of a positive
and explicit clause in the body of the
~or setting at naught the obvious
meaning thereof. The title of an act
cannot limit the plain meaning of the
text. Indeed, resort to the title of
a statute as an aid in the interpretation thereof has even been declared
to be an unsafe criterion, and entitled
to little weight, although this statement authorities as a whole warrant.
The title is not conclusive in regard
to the meaning of a statute.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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And, with respect to constitutional provisions such as our
own (Article VI, Section 22, Utah Constitution, as amended
tn 1972 to include the matter formerly contained in Section
23 of said Article pertaining to the subject of a bill being
clearly expressed in the title) it is stated as follows in
73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, §99:
With regard to a constitutional
provision requiring the subject or object of a statute to be expressed in its
ti~le, it has been said that the effect
thereof is to render a title indispensable.
Although the courts do regard the rule
which eermits the consideration of the
title 1n cases where an enactment is
susceetible of diverse construction, as
eseecully applicable, where the conStltutional provision under consideration
is in effect, the courts do not, as a
whole, go further than this.
In the case at bar there is no ambiguity, uncertainty
or lack of plain meaning in the s,tatute involved

(Section

63-30a-3) which renders it susceptible of diverse construction.
It is a clear and unambiquous statement of the manner in

wh~ch

retroactive claims, such as the respondent's, are to be filed
and makes no provision whatsoever for the application of the
Governmental Immunity Act otherwise to claims arising under
that statute.

Under the foregoing legal principles it is

absolutely clear tnat the title to the act in question cannot
be incorporated as the substantive law in lieu of the unamt>iguous provisions of the statute itself.
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO SUPPORT THE DECREE
AND JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AND THE
SUBSEQUENT "AGREEMENT" BETWEEN RESPONDENT
AND HIS ATTORNEYS, IF ANY, IS INVALID.
The respondent relies heavily upon the case of Oliver
v. Mitchell, 14 U.2d 9, 376 P.2d 390 (1962) as support for the
lower court's finding that the respondent and his counsel
agreed that he would pay reasonable attorneys fees if and when
he obtained the means and that the passage of the statute here
involved provided him with such means and he thereby "incurred•
reasonable attorneys fees of $61,820.00 at the expense of Utah
taxpayers.

In the Oliver case the plaintiff sought recovery

of attorney's fees for defending one Mitchell on a firstdegree murder charge even though the plaintiff had been
appointed by the court to do so at a time when no public compensation was provided for the defense of impecunious persons
charged with crime.

The lower court found that a contract

existed whereby Oliver was to represent Mitchell for a fee
of $5,000 and awarded judgment to the plaintiff for $2,500
plus interest and costs which he sought to recover from
insurance moneys received in prison by Mitchell as beneficiary
of nis brother who was accidentally killed in military service.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The holding of this court. was that indigents are as legally
competent to contract as other men and the attorney was
entitled to recover his fee although the judgment was
limited to half of the fee agreed upon.
The respondent claims that there is no distinguishable difference between the Oliver case and this action.
(Page 18 of Respondent's brief.)

First of all, that action

was predicated upon a contract for a fixed sum payable by
the client himself and not by the body politic through
legislative lobbying efforts.

Secondly, the action was

brought by the attorney himself to recover a fee due and·
owing to him under contract.

Third, the judgment awarded

to the attorney was less than the fee which the court found
the parties had agreed upon.

Fourth, the attorney was

appointed as an officer of the court to defend his indigent
client in a first-degree murder case which did not preclude
an agreement for the payment of his services.

Fifth, the

agreement between the parties was not subsequently changed
to increase the attorney's compensation.

Sixth, the obligation

of the client was fixed by agreement and not by a statute
limiting the recovery of attorneys fees to those which are
"reasonable" and "necessarily incurred".

Eighth, the attorney,

and not the client, was the person benefitted by the judgment.
Ninth, a real controversy and adversary proceeding existed
between the attorney and his client with respect to the fee

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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payable for the attorney's services.

Tenth, the ability

of the client to pay was measured by his own resources and
not by those of the State of Utah.

It is difficult to

understand how counsel for the respondent could find no
distinguishable differences between the case at bar and
the Oliver case in which Mr. Wayne Black, the ostensible
beneficiary of the lower court's judgment in the instant
case, was counsel for Mr. Oliver.
The ultimate question to be resolved in this case
is the amount of the "reasonable

attorney~'

fees and court

costs necessarily incurred" by the respondent in the defense
of the indictments issued against him pursuant to Section
63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted in 1977.
It is undisputed that the respondent's attorneys agreed fn
writing to accept $18,500 as their total fee for services
rendered by letter dated September 3, 1976.

{Exhibit 4-P.)

That such fee was approved and accepted by the respondent
is clearly established by his subsequent written statements.
His immediate response to the foregoing letter from his
attorneys was a note dated September 10, 1976, in which he
acknowledged receiving their "bill", expressed his gratefulness "for all you have done" and stated his realization that
"the fee you have charged me is very, very minimal" (Emphasis
added), and then declared that "(m)y only concern is making
prompt payment to you."

(Exhibit 5-P.)

And then as late as
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September 9, 1977, in a letter to his attorneys (Exhibit 1-D)

ht stated:
• Dea r Mr • B1a c k :

You have indicated that Mr. Joseph
McCarthy. Deputy Attorney General, has
suggested I write you a letter regarding
our final understanding with regard to
the attorneys fee in connection with my
i nd1 ctmen ts.
My best recollection is that in early
October of 1976 I was in your office and
discussed this matter with you. At that
time, I had paid a total of $8,500 on the
fee.
You indicated to me at that t1me
you thought there was an excellent chance
the remaining indictments would be dismissed and that you realized I had been
through a hard financial time. You said
if I paid an additional $10,000 or a
total of $18,500.00, I could consider
the attorneys fee paid in full and that
I could have as much time as I needed
to make the payment. I said T realiz~d
that this amount would nowhere near pay
you and your firm for all you had done
for me, and I told you how grateful I
was for your help and friendship.
I am sure that a day or two after
our conversation you sent me a letter
confirming the above fee arrangement.
My best recollection is that I received
the letter shortly before October 8, 1976.
I relate to this date because on said
date I again came to your office and paid
an additional £2,000.00. I believe that
I returned the letter signed approved to
your office.
At your request, I have searched
my personal effects in the event a copy
of the letter might be among tnem, and
I cannot find a copy. I am not really
sure whether you sent me an extra copy.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I made one additional payment of
$1,000 on the fee, bringing the total
payments I have made to date up to'
$11 ,500.00.
Yours sincerely,
/s/ Gerald E. Hulbert
Gerald E. Hulbert
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, at least a full year after receiving the bfll
in letter form from his attorneys, the respondent acknowledged
the fee arrangement contained therein and stated that he had
returned the letter "signed approved" to his attorney's office.
The absence of that original letter as an evidentiary exhfbft
in this case is of singular interest.

Certainly the letter

containing the only bill ever submitted by the attorneys in
this case to their client and its return with the client's
approval of a fee amounting to $lt,SOO would constitute an
important document to the respondent and his attorneys in
this case.

Such letter was in the exclusive possession

of the respondent or his attorneys and its introduction in
evidence would have been extremely damaging to the plaintiff's
case if it did contain the approval of the fee arrangement
by the respondent.

A

£.Q.Q.Y_

of that letter before jts return

with the express approval of the respondent is all that is
contained in the record of this case.

See Exhibit 4-P.

However, we have the respondent's unambigious admission in
Exhibit 1-D (introduced by the defendant, not the plaintiff,
in the court oelow)

that he had indeed approved of the bill
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and fee arrangement submitted to him by his attorneys.

This

court has recognized that in judging credibility of witnesses
1t is usually assumeo that a person is more likely to be
telling

~he

truth with respect to matters adverse to his

own interests than where it may benefit him.

Cannon v. WrighlL

531 P.2d 1290 (Utah, 1975).

From the foregoing it is absolutely clear that the
•reasonable' attorneys' fees "necessarily incurred" by the
respondent in the defense of the grand jury indictments against
him cannot exceed the agreed-upon amount of $18,500 •. The
judgment of the lower court was not based upon the undisputed
written documentation in evidence, the credibility of which
is certainly superior to the self-serving statements of the
respondent and his beneficiary attorney upon which the trial
judge concluded that "the plaintiff intended his obligation
to be one for reasonable fees at a then undetermined level"
and that Mr. Black "apparently intended that obligation to
be contingent upon plaintiff's future ability to pay, if any."
(See memorandum decision, R. 98-99, quoted at pages 15-16 of
respondent's brief.)

As stated before, it this court re-

cognizes the dual-fee standard espoused by the respondent--one
fee based upon the i ndi vi dual's abi 1 i ty to pay when he is found
guilty under the indictments, the other based upon the state's
ability to pay when he is found not guilty--the mischief
that could result from defense counsels' efforts to guarantee
themselves a sweepstakes prize in the event of success

would~'
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inimical to the ends of justice.
witnesses by

The bribing of _jurors or

attorneys in litigation is not an anheard-of

matter and certainly should not be encouraged by the courts
in this day of increasing disregard of perjury laws, ethics
standards and the criminal law in general by persons of all
walks of life who weigh their own guilt in monetary sc .. s
only in terms of the risk of being caught.
In an apparent effort to overcome the prior holdings of this court in Skeen v. Peterson, 113 U. 483, 196 P.2d
708, and Ashton v. Skeen, 85 U. 489, 39 P.2d 1072, pointed out
at pages 42-45 of appellant's brief on appeal, that contracts
between attorney and client whereby the former's compensation
is increased after the attorney-client relationship is
established are presumptively invalid, the respondent cites
the case of Rudd v. Crown International, 26 U.2d 263, 488 P.2d
298 {1971) involving the recovery of attorney's fees pursuant
to contract.

The entire statement of the court on that matter

is as follows, at pages 301-302 of the P.2d Reporter:
Finally, defendant challenges the
reasonableness of the sum of $10,000,
as found by the trial court in the
award of attorney's fees. The evidence
as testified to by the plaintiff indicates that plaintiffs counsel originally
agreed to work for $35 per hour; as the
action progressed, and the motions and
hearings multiplied, the fee was raised
to ~s.ooo and ultimately to $10,000.
Defendant claims that counsel is limited
to ~35 per hour and that there was no
evidence as to the exact number of
hours so devoted; and, therefore, there
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
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is insufficient evidence to support
the sum aw~rded. Th~s argument is
without merit.
* * *The question of
what is a reasonable attorney's
fee in a contested matter is
not necessarily controlled by
any set formula. What is reasonable depends upon a number of
factors, the amount in controversy,
the extent of services rendered
and other factors which the trial
court is in an advantaged position
to judge. (Quoting from Wallace
v. Build, Inc., 16 U.2d 401, 405,

402 P.2d 699)

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed; costs are awarded to plaintiff.
It is clear from the foregoing that the court's rulincl
was limited solely to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustairl
the award and did not address the underlying question as to
the validity of subsequent agreements whereby an attorney's
fees are increased from those

ori~inally

agreed upon.

It

cannot be determined from the facts stated in the Rudd case
whether the attorney's fee awarded actually exceeded that
originally contracted by the parties.

All that can be said

for the above ruling is that there may be some cases in which
an increase in an attorney's fee from that originally contractE
may be justified.

It certainly

does not stand for the pro-

position that an increase in an attorney's compensation is
valid under all circumstances, and the circumstances of this
case fall squarely within the pronit:>ition of the Skeen v.
Peterson and Ash ton v . 5 k e en c a s e s . s u c' r a , p a r t i c u l a r 1 '•
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nere

the "agreement" entered into subsequent to the original attorney-client fee relationship increases the attorney's compensation
by 3 l/2 times at the "understood" expense of the hapless public
rather than the client himself.

If is interesting to note that

the respondent has not even mentioned the

~

and Ashton cases

in his brief on appeal although they were prominently featured
in aP,pellant's POINT II, at pages 42-45, to which the court
is referred to avoid repetition.
POINT III
THE APPELLANT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO AN APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT
OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT AND THE
ISSUES RAISED HEREIN ARE NOT MOOT.
Under POINT IV of respondent's brief it is claimed
that this appeal presents no
raised are moot.

jus~iciable

claim and the issues

The chronology of events leading to the re-

spondent's efforts to avoid the appeal of the State of Utah
in this case is an interesting study in leap-frogging from
one branch of state government to another and back again
with great resourcefulness but little regard for the doctrine
of separation of powers.

This process may be summarized

as follows:
1.

Following the successful defense of several

indictments consisting of twelve criminal courts arising from
tne respondent's activities as Chairman and Director of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Utah State Liquor Control Commission, the respondent personally
lobbied a bill through a receptive legislature in 1977 authorizing the retroactive recovery of the "reasonable attorney's
fees and "court costs necessarily incurred" by the respondent
therein.
2.

The respondent thereupon filed a claim with the

Governor, Lieutenant Governor/Secretary of State and Attorney
General (who collectively constitute the Board of Examiners of
the State of Utah) although the respondent was only required
to file the claim with the Attorney General in compliance with
the Governmental Immunity Act (§63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated
1953, as amended) as provided in the retroactive provision of
the statute setting forth the manner in which such claims
were to be filed (S63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended).
3.

The respondent then filed his action against the

State of Utah following the 90-day period as provided in the
Governmental Immunity Act without the Board of Examiners of
the State of Utah ever having considered his claim.
4.

After successfully convincing the lower court

that it had jurisdiction to hear the case, against the strong
opposition of the appellant, the respondent obtained a judgment
of $62,384.99 from which the appellant has appealed to this
court on several grounds, including the jurisdiction of the
lower court.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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5.

The respondent then sought relief fro• the Board

of Examiners of the State of Utah in the a•ount of his judg•ent
which was then being appealed by the State of Utah.

The

Board of Examiners, by a 2-1 vote, determined that no act1on
should be taken upon his claim until the Supreme Court of
Utah had rendered a decision on the appeal from the district
court decision and specifically requested that the state
legislature take no action until the appeal was resolved.
(See Exhibits "A" and "B" attached to appellant's prior
Memorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Oral
Argument by Counsel for Respondent.)
6.

Not wishing to

have the appea1 heard by this

court in an action which he himself had engineered from the
beginning, the respondent then went directly to the 1979
legislature offering to accept $50,000 in satisfaction of his
district court judgment if the legislature would appropriate
that sum for payment to him.

The legislature, disregarding

the appeal in which the brief of the State of Utah had already
been filed and the foregoing recommendation of the Board of
Examiners, approved payment to the respondent of $50,000 in
the 1979 Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.B. No. 426).
Even if we assume that the lower court had jurisdiction
to reduce the unliquidated claim of the respondent to judgment,
a position which the appellant has opposed from the commencement
of this action, the question is raised as to the appellant's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
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right of review by appeal to the Supreme Court pursuant to
Art1cle Vlll, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution which provides:
From all final judgments of the district
court , there s ha 11 be a r i g h t of a p pea 1 to
the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be upon
the record made in the court below and under
such regulations as may be provided by law.

* * *
The respondent asserts that the appropriation of the $50,000
by the legislature renders the case moot and the appeal thereof
subject to dismissal.

In order to make such assertion he claims

that the Board of Examiners did exercise its constitutional
power under Article VIII, Section 13, of the Utah Constitution,
by considering and acting upon the respondent's claim prior
to legislative action thereon.

Such claim is clearly erroneous

in light of the minutes of the Board of Examiners meeting on
November 29, 1978, and letter to the Claims Committee of the
1979 Utah Legislature from the Bo'ard of Examiners dated March 1,
1979, which are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" to appellant's

prior Memeorandum in Response to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and
Oral Argument by Counsel for Respondent and are also attached
to Mr. Brant Wall's letter dated April 2, 1979, to Chief JustHe
Crockett.

The only action taken by the Board of Examiners

upon the respondent's

clai~

was to defer action thereon until

such time as the Supreme Court had rendered a final decision
on the appeal from tile district court.

It i<o tnerefore evide"·

that the Legislature totall_, d1s1·ecarded the const1tut1onal
powers of the 6oaro of t\a"•-.ers.

:>e

·:rE fu'i_.

se~

fcr:r
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in Point I of the appellant's brief on appeal. and then
arrogated to itself the right of appellate review vested
exclusively in the Supreme Court.

Thus. if this appeal is

dismissed as moot, the legislature, with the active participation and initiative of the respondent, will have:
(1)

denied the executive branch of the State of Utah (the

Board of Examiners) its constitutional right to consider
and act upon claims of this sort; (2)

pre-empted this court

in the exercise of its appellate powers in a case initiated
by the respondent himself; and (3) denied to the taxpayers
of the State of Utah the right to have a substantial judgment
against the State of Utah reviewed in the Supreme Court as
vouchsafed by the Utah Constitution.

Such a scenario mocks

the provisions of Article V of the Utah Constitution which
reads:
The powers of the government of
the State of Utah shall be divided
into three distinct departments, the
Legislature, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments,
shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except
in the cases herein expressly directed
or permitted.
In this case the Board of Examiners, as an arm of
the Executive branch of our state government, acted exactly
as it should have done by withholding any action upon therespondent's claim until all parties had exhausted their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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constitutionally protected right to have the issues determined
1n the state's highest court.
well

advi~ed

The Legislature would have been

to follow the same constitutional pathway but

chose not to do so in an arrogant disregard of this court's
appellate powers under the Utah Constitution, Article VIII,
Section 4.

It has long been the law of this state that

tho~e

powers cannot be enlarged or abridged by the legislature.
Robinson v. Durand, 36 U. 93, 104 P. 760.

Having usurped the

functions of this court by attempting to contravene the
constitutionally protected rights of the appellant on behalf
of the citizenry of this state to have this case reviewed in
the Supreme Court, the Legislature has exceeded its powers
and, therefore, it is incumbent upon this court to hear this
appeal upon its merits and declare that portion of the 1979
Supplemental Appropriations Act pertaining to the claim of the
respondent to be an invalid exercise of legislative power.
The foregoing argument is based on the initial
vesting of jurisdiction in the lower court to adjudicate
the respondent's claim as claimed

by

the respondent.

Certainly

if such jurisdiction never attached and the Board of Examiners
had exclusive jurisdiction to consider and act upon the
respondent's unliquidated claim, as set forth in POINT I
of appellant's brief on appeal, then this appeal should be
permitted to proceed in due course to establish that jurisdictional right.
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This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the lower
court.

Either it had jurisdiction or it did not.

If it dtd

the legislature should not be permitted to intervene after
that jurisdiction has attached to deprive any party of tts
constitutional right to appeal from an adverse judg•ent of
the district court.

If it did not, it is the constitutional

prerogative of this court to so declare and not for the
legislature to arrogate that judicial function to itself.
The whole thrust of the respondent's argument is that it
may invoke the jurisdiction of the courts part way and,
after obtaining a generous district court judgment, preclude
any appellate review of that judgment by running to a long
friendly legislature for a most lucrative settlement of
hotly contested legal issues against the opposition of the
Board of Examiners.

Such an abuse of the long-established

concept of separation of powers in our state government simply
should not be tolerated by this court.

The faceless mass of

this state's taxpayers deserve better treatment than the
respondent, and the legislature, are willing to grant them.
Dated this/..l/i day of August, 1979.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General of the State
fUtah

A

fJ/.&.ca.·.

K L. CRELLIN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE
hereby certify that ten copies of the foregoing
reply bri~f were filed with the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah on the

IJ;I day

of August, 1979, and that two copies

of said brief were served upon the respondent by depositing
the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, addressed
to Brant H. Wall, 500. Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, Attorney for respondent, on the~day of August,
19 77.

K L.
RELLIN
Assistant Attorney General
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